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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD, ; 
Defendant and Appellant. ' 
) Case No. 940762-CA 
REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE HAS NOT DISTINGUISHED THE MODEL 
STATUTE AND THE UTAH STATUTE. 
Rather than arguing that the offense defined by Model Penal Code 
§224.13 (hereinafter "the model statute") would encompass the facts of the instant case, 
the state attempts to avoid any reference to, or application of, the Model Penal Code 
or its commentaries. Appellee's Br. at 20-21. Indeed, the state is careful not to advance 
any position regarding the scope of the offense defined by the model statute, contending 
only that it and the offense defined by Utah Code Ann. §76-6-513 (hereinafter "the Utah 
statute") are "significantly different" and that "the commentaries to the Model Penal 
Code . . . offer no support for [defendant's] position". Appellee's Br. at 13, 17. 
The Statutory Language. The Utah statute and the model statute both speak in terms 
of "property that has been entrusted to [the accused] as a fiduciary". The only language 
1 
to which this so-called "significant difference" in meaning could possibly be attributed 
is the substitution of "deals with" for "applies or disposes of and, with respect to the 
scienter element, the substitution of "a violation of his duty" for "unlawful". See 
Appellant's Br. at 10 for a visually comparison of the statutes. 
Without attempting to explain why these variations in the language of the 
statutes makes them "significantly different", the state attempts to demonstrate the 
breadth of the Utah statute by reviewing language which is common to both statutes.1 
In discussing what it means to be "entrusted" with "property", the state never addresses 
the meaning of "entrusted", and instead quotes section 76-6-401's definition of 
"property", arguing: "It requires no citation to authority that defendant's real estate 
representation of the Bauers was property, i.e., a valuable business interest."2 
Appellee's Br. at 14. 
The state argument is somewhat fractured at that point. First, the 
argument apparently suggests that the listing agreement between ERA Realty and 
Bauers, the document itself, falls within the definition of "property" as a "writing[] 
representing or embodying rights concerning real property". Id. The apparent 
implication is that not only the writing but also the "powers" embodied therein are also 
"property" and that by virtue of said agreement defendant enjoyed a "measure of 
Apparently, the state itself attributes no significance to the variations between the language of the model 
statute and the Utah statute, noting only that "the penalties [are] very different than these imposed in the 
Model Penal Code". Appellee's Br. at 9. 
In the instant case, the identity of the entrusted property has changed with each of the state's attorneys 
who has identified it. At trial, it was the Bauers' "home and the legal interest associated with that home" (R 
1075-76). At oral argument on defendant's application for certificate of probable cause before this court, it 
became the $4,697.50 gross profit from the "terms" sale and the assignment of the discounted trust deed note. 
It has now become "defendant's real estate representation of the Bauers . . . , i.e., a valuable business interest". 
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control" over the real estate. See id. at 14-15. The first part of this argument suggests 
that the state has identified "property" owned by ERA Realty. The latter part suggests 
that the state has returned to the argument that the real estate itself was entrusted to 
the defendant. 
The state's argument clearly indicates that its view of the scope of the 
offense defined by the Utah statute is at least broad enough to encompass the 
hypothetical scenarios presented in defendant's opening brief3 See Appellant's Br. at 
14-15. Indeed, under the state's theory, the scope and application of the Utah statute 
would arguably extend far beyond these scenarios and criminalize virtually every 
conscious breach of any fiduciary duty from diligence to confidentiality. Almost every 
fiduciary relationship involves something which the state could characterize as 
"property". If you define "property" broadly enough, the meaning to "entrusted" will take 
care of itself. 
Apparently recognizing the limitations of the statutory language, the state 
cites State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987), and urges the court to construe 
section 76-6-513 "broadly". Appellee's Br. at 13-14. Contrary in the position the state 
has taken, Utah Code Ann. §76-1-106 does not indicate that penal statutes should be 
"broadly construed". It simply states that the traditional rule requiring strict construction 
of penal statutes is not to be applied. 
Although in Frampton, the Utah Supreme Court says that Utah's criminal 
simulation statute, "like other consumer protection statutes . . . , must be construed 
nThe state indicates that "the trial court rejected defendant's hypotheticals". Appellee's Br. at 15-16. On 
the contrary, the trial court embraced them, "agreeing that the fiduciaries in the hypotheticals] would 
appropriately be convicted of the same offense" (R 1102). 
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broadly", id- at 193, the court actually did nothing more than decline an invitation to 
adopt a strict construction. Frampton argued that the statute should be construed to 
apply only to unique chattels such as antiques and paintings. The court concluded that 
"the plain language of our statute" did not require such a narrow application.4 See id. 
at 192. There is no occasion to construe a penal statute broadly or strictly if the statute 
is devoid of ambiguity. United States v. Culbert 435 U.S. 371, 379, 98 S.Ct. 1112, 
, 55 L.Ed. 2d 349, 355-56 (1978). 
Section 76-1-106 states that penal statutes are to be "construed according 
to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law 
and general purposes of Section 76-1-104." Among these is the constitutional mandate 
that the state give "fair warning" of what conduct is criminalized. This mandate is 
codified in the statutory injunction that penal statues be construed so as to "[djefine 
adequately the conduct and mental state which constitute each offense...." Utah Code 
Ann. §76-1-104(2). 
This policy is not violated by construing statutes according to the "fair 
import of their terms". However, it does not sanction a construction of a penal statute 
which would expand the statute beyond the language which the Legislation selected. 
Use of the Commentaries. The state advances no position regarding the scope of the 
model statute other than to say that the Utah statute is "significantly different" and then 
argues that there is no ambiguity in the language of the Utah statute. Defendant agrees 
that there is no room for reasonable debate concerning the scope and application of the 
4The holding in Frampton is in harmony with the commentary to Model Penal Code §224.2 and with 
decisions applying to similar statutes in other jurisdictions. 
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Utah statute, but argues that it and the model statute are comparable. Certainly, the 
state and the defendant cannot both be right. 
The state contends that the Utah statute is "so different from section 
224.1[3] of the Model Penal Code, [that] neither the model statute nor its associated 
commentaries throw any light on the application of section 76-6-513". Appellee's Br. 
at 20. Accordingly, the state's brief never considers these commentaries and urges the 
court to disregard them. The state fails to cite a single authority supporting its 
contention that the Utah statute is not comparable to the model statute and fails to 
identify any distinction between the two other than the grade of the offense. See 
Appellee's Br. at 9, 19. Moreover, the state fails to cite a single authority for the 
proposition that a similar statute or any statute of a sister state has been applied to any 
case even remotely comparable to the case at bar. 
In contending that the Utah statute is comparable to the model statute, 
the defendant is apparently in the good company of the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court. In State v. Merski, 465 A.2d 491, 493 (N.H. 1983), that court resorted to the 
Model Penal Code and Commentaries in order to determine the scope of the offense 
defined by NHRSA 638.11, which is also patterned after the model statute. The New 
Hampshire statute includes stylistic changes identical to those which were incorporated 
in the Utah statute.5 
The Model Penal Code commentaries provide helpful insight in 
understanding the policies promoted and the evils condemned by the model statute. 
A legislature might "borrow" a particular statutory formulation 
The texts of the New Hampshire statute and the Utah statute are compared in the Addendum to 
defendant's opening brief. 
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from some other source, in which case a court construing the 
enactment will understandably place considerable reliance upon 
authoritative pronouncements concerning the intended meaning of 
the source formulation. Not at all uncommon these days is a 
court's reliance upon the Model Penal Code commentary when 
interpreting a statute following rather closely a section in the 
Model Penal Code. 
1 LaFave and Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §2.2(1), at p. 123. 
Whether or not the state is willing to concede it, the model statute has a 
very specific application and a limited scope. It criminalizes unauthorized risk-taking 
with respect to "property restricted by law to particular uses, such as property held in 
trust or public funds appropriated for designated purpose." Comment 1 at 358. Cf. 
Comment 2(b) at 362. 
Legislative History. The state contends that if there is any need to resort of material 
outside of the language of the statute, the court should review the Utah statute's 
"meaningful legislative history" rather than consulting the model code commentaries. 
Appellee's Br. at 18-19. The legislative history of the enactment and the subsequent 
amendment of section 76-6-513 provides no evidence of any intent to expand the scope 
of the offense defined by the model statute. 
The state misapprehends defendant's observations regarding the 1983 
amendment of the Utah statute which changed the grade of the offense. See Appellee's 
Br. at 16-17, 19. Defendant simply noted that the model statute classified the offense 
as a misdemeanor because of the nature of the evil it was intended to address. When 
the Utah statute was enacted it also defined the offense as a misdemeanor. This is 
another indication that the Utah statute is intended to address the same evil which is 
the target of the model statute. Appellant's Br. at 12. 
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Apparently, the state would concede that the model statute and the Utah 
statute were comparable prior to the 1983 amendment. The state has not identified or 
discussed any distinction between the two other than the grade of the offense and this 
distinction did not exist prior to the 1983 amendment. See Appellee's Br. at 9. Indeed, 
the so-called "meaningful legislative history" upon which the state relies relates 
exclusively to the 1983 amendment. See id. at 18. 
The 1983 amendment altered nothing but the method of grading the 
offense. The amendment was clearly motivated by a concern that a fiduciary who 
committed a felony theft may avoid a substantial part of the penalty by invoking section 
76-6-513 as a shield. See Appellant's Br. at 12, fn. 3. This is made all the more 
apparent by the additional legislative history which the state has provided. See 
Appellee's Br. at 19, fn. 8; Addendum C. This history provides no evidence of an intent 
to enlarge the scope of the offense defined by the statute. Indeed, the state advances 
no argument indicating how such an amendment could have effectively changed the 
elements of the offense and extended the scope of its application. 
The elements of a criminal offense are not defined by the level of the 
penalty which may be imposed upon conviction. As the state itself has noted, the 
Legislature may proscribe conduct and prescribe penalties, subject only to state and 
federal constitutional limitations. See id. at 17. It is inconceivable that, by an 
amendment which changed only the grade of the offense, the Legislature also intended, 
not only to expand the scope of the offense but, to extend it to limits which even the 
state's prosecutors will not venture to define. 
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POINT II 
THE STATE'S JURY UNANIMITY ARGUMENTS FAIL TO 
DISTINGUISH ALTERNATIVE MENS REA AND 
ALTERNATIVE ACTUS REUS. 
Alternative Mens Rea vs. Alternative Actus Reus. Defendant has always conceded that 
if the mens rea element of an offense can be satisfied by proof of one of two or more 
blameworthy mental states, the jury is not necessarily required to unanimously agree on 
which mens rea the defendant possessed. For example, if the statute defines the mens 
rea as "knowing that [property] has been stolen or believing that it probably has been 
stolen", those jurors who may have concluded that the defendant "knew" have also at 
least concluded that he "believed". Cf. Utah Code Ann. §§76-2-103 and -104 ("Conduct 
is an offense if a person engages in it recklessly, the conduct is an offense also if a 
person engages in it intentionally or knowingly").6 If, on the other hand, the jurors are 
not required to agree on what the defendant knew or believed we have a problem. 
In quoting the language of State v Russell 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987), at 
page 23 of its brief, the state seeks the application of the quoted language to an issue 
which are clearly distinguished from the issue that was decided in that case. Whatever 
the breath of the language quoted, the holding in Russell can be no broader than the 
issue actually decided in that case. See DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 435 (Utah 1995). 
In deciding Russell, the Utah Supreme Court discussed United States v. 
Gipson, 533 F.2d 453 (CA5 1977), and distinguished it as a case involving alternative 
HThe mens rea issue, on this level, is one, not of the present of a blameworthy state of mind but, of its 
magnitude. If the magnitude of the blameworthy state of mind is a factor in determining whether or not a 
particular offense has been committed, unanimity is required. Cf. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 541 (Utah 1987), 
577-80 (Stewart,)., concurring in the result); 585-88 (Durham, J., dissenting); 591 (Zimmerman, J., dissenting). 
If the grade of a theft by receiving offense were based on the magnitude the blameworthy of state of mind 
(knowing v. believing) rather than the value of the property, unanimity on the mens rea issue would surely 
become as important as it now is regarding the issue of value. 
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actus reus. 733 P.2d at 167. In deciding the alternative mens rea issue, the supreme 
court declared: "We limit our decision to that proposition and do not express any 
opinion on the necessity of unanimity in other situations not presented in this case." Id. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has already concluded that the rule 
announced in Russell does not necessarily extended to cases alleging different actus reus. 
See State v. Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 589 (Utah App. 1995). 
In the instant case, the statute defined a single mens rea: knowledge -
guilty knowledge that defendant's conduct constitutes a violation of her duty. The 
district court's instructions to the jury identified four duties, each of which the defendant 
allegedly violated (R 296). The district court then itself identified two breaches of duty 
which the court concluded may provide a basis for a conviction (R 990). The individual 
jurors may have reached different conclusions about which duty the defendant knowingly 
violated and what acts or omissions constituted that violation. See Appellant's Br. at 
17-20. 
The state fails to distinguish the issue presented by this case from the issue 
decided in Russell. Moreover, the state fails to deal with or even mention Gipson and 
its progeny. See Appellant's Br. at 18-19. 
Sufficiency of Evidence of Each Alternate Actus Reus. Defendant contends that the rule 
announced in State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991), requires reversal if any one 
of the theories of criminal responsibility lacks the requisite evidentiary or legal 
foundation. 
Defendant contends all of the state's theories are flawed as a matter of 
law. See Point I, supra, and Appellant's Br. at 9-17. Furthermore, on a factual level, 
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the defendant has identified documentary evidence which establishes that the written 
offer disclosed that Packer did not have cash "in hand" when the offer was made or 
accepted (Exhibit 6, 115). See id. at 21. 
Defendant does not, as the state suggests, concede the sufficiency of the 
evidence on the theory that defendant !,fail[ed] to inform the Bauers that she already 
had a buyer . . . waiting in the wings". Appellee's Br. at 25. Defendant has marshalled 
the evidence on this issue. See Appellant's Br. at 3-8. Further, defendant has shown 
the court that: 
The defendant testified that there had been no discussions or 
agreements regarding a sale to Bassetts prior to Bauers' 
acceptance of Packer's offer to purchase (R 1005-06, 1008-09, 
1035-36). None of the state's witnesses contradicted her (R 737-
39, 741, 766, 777-78, 840-41, 851, 858-59). 
Appellant's Br. at 6. 
If Bassetts had already contracted to purchase, agreed to purchase, 
discussed purchasing, or thought about purchasing the house before Bauers had 
contracted to sell it, why did the state not have Nicole Packer, Vickie Bassett or Dan 
Bassett so testify? Why was the state's prosecutor, who obviously thought it so 
important to present evidence on this issue, reduced to making questionable and futile 
attempts to establish this "fact" through the use of questions which assumed the "facts" 
he could not prove? See Appellant's Br. at 22-24. 
In the final analysis, the district court's observation, made while Tom 
Goodman was testifying, was still true after the last bit of evidence was received: "Well, 
we don't have evidence of that yet. . . ." (R 827). 
Rather than using available direct evidence, the state elected to "prove" 
this "fact" by the inferences the jury might draw from the circumstantial evidence. 
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While there are volumes of material discussing the adequacy, and indeed 
sometimes the desirability, of circumstance evidence, defendant concedes that there is 
no authority for the proposition that the state must present any available direct evidence 
and cannot rely on inference. Indeed, as far as defendant can determine, there is not 
case authority either way on the subject. One can only assume that the state usually 
presents the strongest and most satisfactory evidence it can muster. 
Cram v. Reynolds, 55 Utah 384, 186 P. 100 (1919), was an appeal from 
judgment denying plaintiffs' claim for reformation of a contract. Plaintiffs presented 
evidence of specific discussions concerning certain water rights which were allegedly 
omitted from the contract by mistake. Defendant never disputed this testimony, relying 
on "a general and sweeping assertion that nothing was omitted from the contract." Id. 
at 390. The supreme court formulated the first issue: "The testimony of the [plaintiffs] 
being uncontradicted except inferentially, what weight should be given to their 
testimony?" Id. The court then concluded: 
It is a legal maxim that when a party has the means in his power 
of rebutting and explaining the evidence adduced against him, if it 
does not tend to the truth, the omission to do so furnishes a strong 
inference against him. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Defendant contends that even if a jury could have covered the gaps in the 
state's evidence by inferences which it reasonably drew, the "strong inference" against 
the state arising by its unexplained failure, notwithstanding its ability, to produce 
stronger and more satisfactory evidence, outweighs any inference which the jury could 
have drawn. This theory of wrongdoing was not proved by satisfactory evidence. 
Again, because we are unable to determine whether the jury unanimously 
11 
agreed on this or some* other theory, the verdict cannot stand even if the court should 
determine that the evidence was sufficient to prove this theory of misconduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the defendant's 
conviction must be reversed. Alternatively, in the event the court shall determine that 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-513 has application to the facts of this case, the conviction must 
nevertheless be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. 
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